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Antitrust Leniency with Multiproduct Colluders†
By Leslie M. Marx, Claudio Mezzetti, and Robert C. Marshall*
We use a global games approach to model alternative implementa­
tions of an antitrust leniency program as applied to multiproduct col­
luders. We derive several policy design lessons; e.g., we show that it is  
pos sible that linking leniency across products increases the likelihood 
of conviction in the first product investigated but reduces it in subse­
quent products. Thus, firms may have an incentive to form sacrificial 
cartels and apply for leniency in less valuable products to reduce 
convictions in more valuable products. Cartel profiling can mitigate 
this undesirable effect, but also reduces the probability of convic­ 
tion in the first product investigated. (JEL D43, D86, K21, L12, L41)
In recent years, antitrust leniency programs in the United States, European Union, Australia, and elsewhere have played an important role in allowing com-
petition authorities to successfully prosecute major price fixing conspiracies.1 A 
review of the European Commission (EC) decisions in cartel cases for 2001–2012 
shows that a firm received a 100 percent reduction in the fine through the leniency 
program in 55 (54 percent) of the 101 products in which firms were prosecuted.2 
1
  “The Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program is its most important investigative tool for detecting cartel activ-
ity. Corporations and individuals who report their cartel activity and cooperate in the Division’s investigation of 
the cartel reported can avoid criminal conviction, fines, and prison sentences if they meet the requirements of the 
program.” (United States Department of Justice website, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/leniency.html, 
accessed October 22, 2012). As Chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), 
Graeme Samuel stated that ACCC’s Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct was “absolutely vital” in the Australian 
government’s efforts to crack cartels and credited it with exposing potential cases at the rate of about one a month 
(Beaton-Wells and Fisse 2011, 379). See also Beaton-Wells (2008a, b) and Wils (2007). 
2 Some EC decisions apply to more than one product. For example, the EC decision in Vitamins covers multiple 
vitamin products, with a separate application of the leniency program for each product. The EC’s leniency program 
also offers smaller fine reductions for cooperators other than the first to apply for leniency. In 87 (86 percent) of the 
products, a firm received some reduction in the fine. In the United States, an official at the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) has stated that, in addition to the initial leniency applicant, as many as four firms may receive a “substantial 
assistance” discount on their fine of as much as 25–30 percent. (Statements of Lisa Phelan, head of the National 
Criminal Enforcement Section, at the 61st ABA Antitrust Law Spring Meeting, April 10–12, 2013, as reported by 
MLex, “Up to Four Companies Can Be “Second-In” To Get Antitrust Cooperation Discount, Official Says,” April 
10, 2013.) In Australia, only one firm can obtain a discount under the Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct, but 
others may obtain a discount under the Cooperation Policy. 
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Table 1 lists EC cartel cases for 2001–2012 in which a firm received a 100 percent 
fine reduction.
Antitrust leniency programs can take different forms and have evolved over time.3 
One of the key changes to the US antitrust leniency program in 1993 was to allow 
firms to apply for leniency even after the DOJ had received information about illegal 
antitrust activity (so-called Type B leniency).4 Changes to the EU antitrust leniency 
program in 2002 also allowed for leniency after an investigation had been opened.5 
US programs directed at multiproduct colluders include Amnesty Plus, introduced 
in 1999, under which a firm being prosecuted for collusion that has not received 
leniency can qualify for reduced fines if it applies for leniency in a separate product 
in which it is also engaged in collusion,6 and Penalty Plus, under which the failure 
to report collusion in separate products can put firms at risk for increased penalties 
should they later be prosecuted for collusion in those products.7 In addition, there 
have been changes related to the treatment of ringleaders, the scope for individual 
leniency, and the use of provisions for excluding certain individuals from being 
covered under corporate leniency.
Just as policies related to antitrust leniency have evolved, undoubtedly so 
have cartel strategies for dealing with leniency. This raises questions about cartel 
3 For a description of the evolution of US and EC leniency programs, see Wils (2008a, Chapter 5). 
4 “A company will qualify for leniency even after the Division has received information about the illegal anti-
trust activity, whether this is before or after an investigation is formally opened, if the following [seven] conditions 
are met: … .” (Hammond and Barnett 2008, 5) According to Motta and Polo (2003, 349), “The key mechanism of 
leniency programs is the rule that allows firms to receive fine reductions even after an investigation is opened.” 
5 See Spagnolo (2008, Section 7.2.2) and Stephan (2009, 554 and Table 4). In Australia, leniency applications 
are permitted until the ACCC has received written legal advice that it has sufficient evidence to commence pro-
ceedings in the case. 
6 See Lefouili and Roux (2012) for a discussion and theoretical model of Amnesty Plus. See also Wils (2008a, 
Chapter 5.4.4). 
7 See Masoudi (2007, 8). 
Table 1—EC Cartel Cases 2001–2012 with a Firm Receiving a 100 Percent  
Fine Reduction Based on the Leniency Program
Airfreight Elevators and escalators Methylglucamine
Aluminum fluoride Exotic fruit (bananas) Monochloroacetic acid
Animal feed phosphates Fine art auction houses Mountings for windows and window-doors
Bananas Fittings Needles
Bathroom fittings and fixtures Food flavor enhancers Nederlands beer market
Bitumen Nederland Freight forwarding Organic peroxide
Bitumen Spain Gas insulated switchgear Power transformers
Calcium carbide Hard haberdashery: fasteners Prestressing steel
Candle waxes Heat stabilizers Refrigeration compressors
Carbonless paper Hydrogen peroxide Rubber chemicals
Chloroprene rubber Industrial bags Sodium chlorate
Choline chloride LCD Sorbates
Consumer detergents Luxembourg brewing industry Specialty graphite
Copper plumbing tubes Marine hoses Synthetic rubber (BR/ESBR)
CRT glass bulbs Methacrylates Vitamins
DRAM Methionine Water management products
Electrical and mechanical carbon 
 and graphite products
source: Authors’ calculations based on EC Decisions at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html
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 strategies to undermine or even benefit from leniency policies. As stated by Wils 
(2008a, 137):
[s]uccessful cartels tend to be sophisticated organisations, capable of 
learning. it is thus safe to assume that cartel participants will try to adapt 
their organisation to leniency policies, not only so as to minimise the 
destabilising effect, but also, where possible, to exploit leniency policies to 
facilitate the creation and maintenance of cartels. This raises the question 
whether there could be features of leniency programmes that risk being 
exploited to perverse effects.
In this paper,we focus on the effect of leniency policies on multiproduct  colluders.8 
The list of firms engaged in collusion in more than one product is long. Table 2, 
which is based on EC cartel cases, lists multiproduct colluders that have received a 
100 percent fine reduction through the leniency program in at least one of the prod-
ucts in which they were prosecuted. Table 3 shows firms colluding in three or more 
products that did not receive a complete fine reduction in any of the products where 
they were prosecuted.9
8 In what follows, we sometimes refer to “cartels” in more than one product, but these may be appropriately 
viewed as components of a single overarching conspiracy. 
9 There were an additional 38 multiproduct colluders that were colluding in only two products and that did not 
receive a complete fine reduction in either product. 
Table 2—Multiproduct Colluders that Received a Complete Fine Reduction in at 
Least One Product in EC Cartel Cases 2001–2012
Firm
Products with 
collusion
Products with 
no fine 
reduction
Products with 
incomplete fine 
reduction
Products with 
complete fine 
reduction
Akzo Nobel 9 2 4 3
Takeda 6 4 1 1
Aventis 5 2 3
William Prym 5 1 3 1
Bayer 4 2 2
KONE 4 1 1 2
Otis 4 3 1
Degussa 3 1 2
Merck 3 1 1 1
Samsung 3 1 2
Shell 3 2 1
ABB Ltd. 2 1 1
Boliden 2 1 1
BP 2 2
Chemtura 2 2
Chiquita 2 2
DHL and Exel 2 2
GrafTech International 2 2
Kemira Oyj 2 1 1
Mueller 2 2
Siemens 2 1 1
source: Authors’ calculations based on EC Decisions at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
cartels/cases/cases.html
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We construct a model that allows us to examine the effects on multiproduct col-
luders of different implementations of an antitrust leniency program by a compe-
tition authority. We developed our model using information obtained in detailed 
interviews with defense attorneys experienced in taking firms through the leniency 
process at the DOJ. Based on these interviews, corporate leniency applications 
occur under three general sets of circumstances: applications under Type A leniency, 
which means the DOJ has not yet opened an investigation; applications under Type B 
leniency, which means the DOJ has already opened an investigation; and follow-up 
leniency applications, where a firm being prosecuted for collusion in one product 
applies for leniency in a separate product. The division between Type A and Type B 
leniency is approximately 80–90 percent Type B and 10–20 percent Type A.10 In the 
model, we focus on type B leniency and follow-up leniency applications.11
10 In the United States, the DOJ maintains the confidentiality of leniency applicants, although in some cases the 
identity of a leniency applicant is available through other sources. In Europe, EC decisions in cartel cases identify 
leniency applicants. A review of these cases shows that the percentage of cases in which a firm applies for leniency 
prior to the start of an investigation by the EC is greater than the 10–20 percent indicated for the United States. 
However, in many of these cases, it may be that the firm was applying for leniency in Europe as a response to an 
investigation in the United States. According to Bloom (2007), roughly half of the leniency applications received by 
the EC follow leniency applications in the United States: “One important factor that is likely to lead to an overesti-
mate of the success of the EC leniency program is where applications to the Commission either followed on from 
those to the US Department of Justice (DOJ) or were simultaneous. The prime aim of any applicant is normally to 
avoid US criminal sanctions. But once a US investigation is stimulated by an amnesty application, other authorities 
will start investigations as they become aware at some stage of the US one. Hence, applications need to be made 
simultaneously to other authorities or as soon as possible after one to the DOJ. It is the US powers rather than the 
EC (or other jurisdiction) powers that drive these applications. However, if the applicants could not secure leniency 
in the EC as well as the US it is highly likely that a significant proportion of them would not apply for US amnesty 
as they would not be able to avoid heavy EC fines. In approaching half of the EC cases from 2000 there was a prior 
or simultaneous application for amnesty under the US program.” (Bloom, 2007, 8–9). 
11 An application for type A leniency would unfold as in the case of type B leniency, except that events are 
typically triggered when the involvement of the firm in potentially illegal activity comes to the attention of an 
Table 3—Multiproduct Colluders that Colluded in Three or  
More Products and Did Not Receive a Complete Fine Reduction  
in any Product in EC Cartel Cases 2001–2012
Firm
Products with 
collusion
Products with no  
fine reduction
Products with  
incomplete fine 
reduction
Roche 13 4 9
BASF 11 2 9
Arkema 6 3 3
Coats 6 3 3
Elf Acquitaine 4 1 3
Schindler 4 3 1
SGL 4 4
Thyssen Krupp 4 2 2
AC Treuhand 3 3
Barbour Threads 3 1 2
Hitachi 3 3
Schenker 3 1 2
Toshiba 3 3
UPS 3 3
YKK 3 1 2
source: Authors’ calculations based on EC Decisions at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/
cartels/cases/cases.html
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An application for type B leniency would unfold as follows. Potential collusion in 
a product comes to the attention of the DOJ, perhaps because buyers of the product 
or their trade association have approached the DOJ with economic circumstantial 
evidence suggestive of collusion. The DOJ opens an investigation. When the col-
luding firms become aware of the investigation, they retain outside legal counsel. 
It is natural to expect firms to become aware of an investigation at approximately 
the same time because public information would be available to all and subpoenas 
would typically be served on the same day. Outside counsel contacts the DOJ to find 
out whether leniency is still available. If it is, counsel starts an internal investigation 
at the firm to assess whether the firm has been engaged in illegal activity, in partic-
ular whether there is sufficient evidence to enable the firm to admit definitively to 
a violation of the antitrust laws. Counsel reports the results of the investigation to 
the firm’s board of directors. The board will weigh the tradeoffs between applying 
for leniency and not. Because this scenario plays out in all of the colluding firms at 
roughly the same time, firms must be concerned that co-conspirators will beat them 
in the race to be first to apply for leniency.
In all cases, firms being prosecuted for collusion are asked if there are any other 
products in which they are colluding. At that point, the board of directors must 
make decisions related to that. If the firm denies colluding in other products, and 
if the DOJ later incurs the expense to investigate and prosecute the firm’s activities 
in another product, the firm would not necessarily have the option of applying for 
leniency in that product, and individuals might be vulnerable to prosecution for 
obstruction of justice and/or perjury.
Our model focuses on leniency applications that are triggered either by the ini-
tiation of a DOJ investigation (type B leniency) or by the prosecution of a firm 
for collusion in a separate product. Whether the cartel is successfully prosecuted 
depends on a number of factors, including (i) whether the potential existence of the 
cartel comes to the attention of the competition authority, (ii) the strength of the 
evidence uncovered by the competition authority’s investigation, and (iii) whether 
cartel members apply for leniency. If more than one cartel member applies for leni-
ency, then only one, chosen at random, is designated as receiving leniency. If a 
cartel is successfully prosecuted, cartel members not covered by the leniency policy 
are fined.
We show that leniency programs enhance the detection of cartels but that the 
incentives for leniency application, and hence the probability of successful pros-
ecutions, can be affected by linkages across markets in the antitrust leniency pro-
gram. Specifically, in our model a penalty-plus antitrust leniency program that asks 
firms convicted of collusion to attest to whether or not they are colluding in any 
other product markets can increase leniency applications in the first product inves-
tigated but reduce the probability of prosecution in the other products. It is possible 
that such a linkage in the leniency program creates incentives for firms to form 
sacrificial cartels and apply for leniency in small products where penalties would 
be limited in order to reduce the probability of conviction in larger, more  valuable 
employee, who would typically report the concerns to the firm’s general counsel, who decides whether to bring in 
outside counsel to investigate. 
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products. We show that these undesirable effects can be mitigated by cartel pro-
filing, that is by increasing the probability of investigation for other products pro-
duced by firms found to be engaged in collusion. At the same time, by reducing the 
incentives of firms to apply for leniency in the first product under investigation for 
collusion, cartel profiling reduces the probability of conviction in the first product 
investigated. In addition, in our model the effectiveness of leniency programs for 
detecting cartels is improved if there is a greater likelihood that firms’ internal 
investigations into possible antitrust offenses will be successful, which suggests 
there is value in policies that enhance cooperation by employees and facilitate the 
discovery of incriminating evidence. We consider implications for the allocation 
of antitrust enforcement resources and show that resources directed at investiga-
tions and prosecutions are strategic complements for generating convictions and 
that resources must be devoted to both investigation and prosecution in order for 
a leniency program to be effective in terms of improving detection and deterrence 
of cartels.
In Section I, we discuss related literature. In Section II, we present the model and 
provide a benchmark result for the case without a leniency program. In Section III, 
we identify the continuation equilibrium in the second market under investigation, 
while in Section IV, we derive the full equilibrium for both a standard leniency and 
a penalty-plus leniency program. Section V contains the main policy insights of the 
paper. Section VI concludes and argues that our model and its insights have wider 
applicability, as they apply to any situation where a group of agents in a coalition 
(e.g., a criminal organization or gang) face an external threat to the stability of their 
relationship (e.g., by law enforcement).
I. Literature
There is a substantial economics literature on antitrust leniency.12 The the-
oretical literature, including Spagnolo (2000, 2004); Motta and Polo (2003); 
Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2005, 2006); Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006); Chen 
and Harrington (2007); Harrington (2008); Lefouili and Roux (2012); Chen and 
Rey (2013); and Choi and Gerlach (2013) has focused on repeated games mod-
els and on the self-enforcement of a cartel structure. The collusive behavior is 
supported as an equilibrium in a supergame without need for communication and 
without interfirm transactions.13 In the context of these models, one can analyze 
how the range of discount factors or the range of collusive payoffs under which 
collusion can be supported is affected by various implementations of leniency 
programs. These papers provide important insights related to the optimal design 
of leniency programs. In general, they suggest that the introduction of a leniency 
program makes it more difficult for firms to support collusion, although they rec-
ognize that to the extent that leniency programs reduce expected fines, they may 
reduce deterrence.
12 For surveys, see Rey (2003) and Spagnolo (2008). See also Wils (2008a, Chapter 5). 
13 See Green, Marshall, and Marx (2014) for a discussion of the role of communication in supporting collusion. 
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A different approach is taken by Harrington (2013), who considers the case of a 
cartel that has ended, so deviations from the collusive agreement are no longer an 
issue, but where the threat remains that firms might disclose the cartel to authorities 
and apply for leniency. Harrington (2013) assumes, as we do, that the firms face 
uncertainty over the probability that the cartel will be discovered and prosecuted 
in the absence of a leniency applicant, but his model differs in many ways from 
ours. Other approaches are taken by Brisset and Thomas (2004), who provide an 
auction-based model, and Motchenkova (2004), who considers an optimal  stopping 
model. Angelucci and Han (2012) consider the interaction of leniency with the with-
in-firm principal-agent problem. For empirical analysis of leniency, see Stephan 
(2009), Miller (2009), Sokol (2012), and Zhou (2012), and for experimental results, 
see Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) and Bigoni et al. (2012a, b).
The literature has also addressed the potential for the strategic use of leniency by 
cartels. The potential benefits to a cartel from explicitly including leniency appli-
cations in their collusive strategy in order to obtain the benefits of reduced fines 
are considered by Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2004), Chen and Harrington 
(2007), and Chen and Rey (2013). This literature suggests that generous leniency 
programs may be exploited by cartels.
Our approach differs in two fundamental ways from the existing literature. First, 
we are interested in understanding the incentive to be the first firm to apply for leni-
ency after an investigation has been started by the competition authority. To do so, 
we abstract from the dynamic self-enforcing constraint and use instead a modeling 
approach based on global games to solve the coordination game induced by a leni-
ency program.14 Second, our focus is on multiproduct colluders.15
Coordination games commonly result in multiple equilibria. For example, if a 
firm expects its co-conspirator to apply for leniency, then the firm expects to be 
prosecuted, so it would typically have an incentive also to apply, hoping to be first 
in the door and avoid paying a fine. But if a firm expects that its co-conspirators will 
not apply for leniency, then it may be a best response also not to apply if that allows 
collusive profits to continue. The theory of global games has shown that often the 
existence of multiple equilibria relies on common knowledge of payoffs, but that 
if players have private information, the equilibrium is unique (see Carlsson and 
van Damme (1993a, b) and Morris and Shin (2002)). The theory of global games 
presents a natural way to look at the issue of leniency, where each player has two 
main strategies and where it is natural to view the probability of conviction as not 
being common knowledge, but known with error by the firms in a cartel. Although 
the coordination game aspect of leniency applications typically generates multiple 
equilibria and is a key issue in studying the effects of leniency programs, the global 
games approach allows us to identify a unique Bayesian equilibrium that survives 
iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
14 Often colluding firms are able to set up the necessary structures to control secret deviations, such as the pric-
ing allocation, and enforcement structures outlined by Stigler (1964). For further discussion of collusive structures, 
see Marshall and Marx (2012, Chapter 6). 
15 See Choi and Gerlach (2012) on the effects on multiproduct cartels of demand linkages among products. 
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II. Model
We consider two symmetric firms that have chosen to form an illegal cartel in 
each of two markets.16 Consistent with the US experience, we focus on leniency 
applications that happen after the cartel is under investigation by the competition 
authority (type B leniency). If a firm comes under investigation by the competition 
authority in one of the two markets, the firm’s board of directors brings in outside 
counsel to do an internal investigation. Such an investigation leaves open the possi-
bility that insufficient evidence is uncovered to support a leniency application even 
though a cartel was, in fact, active. This is especially true because the ability of a 
firm’s outside antitrust counsel to uncover evidence of collusion depends on the 
cooperation of managers with knowledge of the conspiracy, whose interest may 
be to avoid detection.17 Furthermore, firms that offer cartel management services 
provide counseling on avoiding detection and the maintenance of incriminating 
 documents at a site out of the reach of key antitrust authorities, making detection 
more difficult.18
If the internal investigation does not uncover evidence that would allow a leni-
ency application, which happens with probability  1 − ρ , then there is no option of 
applying for leniency. If the internal investigation at firm  i related to product  j does 
uncover evidence, which happens with probability  ρ, then the investigation also pro-
vides outside counsel with a signal  θ ij as to the probability  τ j that the cartel would 
be prosecuted in the absence of any leniency applicant. Outside counsel then advises 
the board of directors on next steps and the board of directors makes the choice 
between applying for leniency or not. At the time of this choice, the board does not 
know whether the internal investigation at the other firm has uncovered evidence 
sufficient to allow a leniency application by that firm, or if it has, what choice was 
made by the other firm.
16 We discuss later how our results could be extended to more general settings where firms are not symmetric, 
there are more than two firms, and the cartels in the two markets are composed by different firms; see footnotes 23 
and 25. 
17 By cooperating, a manager promotes the prosecution of the cartel, which would potentially leave the manager 
labeled as someone who has engaged in illegal price fixing, fired from his or her current position, and have severe 
future career consequences. Furthermore, if a manager cooperates, the firm may not get leniency, or if it does, that 
manager may be “carved out” by the antitrust authority from the corporate leniency agreement and so face criminal 
prosecution. 
18 For example, colluding firms might expend resources to engage a third party facilitator for the cartel that 
could manage incriminating evidence. The EC Decision in organic Peroxides, states that the cartel maintained 
certain documents at the premises of the consulting firm AC Treuhand in Switzerland: “[AC Treuhand] produced, 
distributed and recollected the so called ‘pink’ and ‘red’ papers with the agreed market shares which were, because 
of their colour, easily distinguishable from other meeting documents and were not allowed to be taken outside the 
AC Treuhand premises.” (EC Decision in organic Peroxides at par. 92(b)) In addition, AC Treuhand “reimbursed 
the travel expenses of the participants, in order to avoid traces of these meetings in the companies’ accounts” (par. 
92(d)) and “instructed all participants on the legal dangers of parts of these meetings and on what measures to take 
to avoid detection of these arrangements’ bearing on Europe.” (par. 92(j)) One would expect this type of strategy 
to reduce the ability of cartel firms to be able to produce sufficient evidence to qualify for leniency. In organic 
Peroxides, there were leniency applications: “[Peroxid Chemie] and Laporte [later Degussa] provided in their sub-
mission the original of the initial main agreement of 1971, which they obtained from AC Treuhand while preparing 
the leniency application. It was printed on pink paper, as were other confidential cartel documents which were not 
allowed to be taken out of the premises of AC Treuhand.” (EC Decision in organic Peroxides at par.83) (http://
ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37857/37857_100_1.pdf) 
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We assume the firms are symmetric and that  π j is each firm’s payoff in product 
j ∈  {1, 2} when it does not apply for leniency and is not prosecuted. A firm’s payoff 
when it is successfully prosecuted and fined (with no leniency granted) is  −f  π j . We 
let  −ℓ π j be the payoff when granted leniency in product  j , where  ℓ < f , so that the 
payoff is higher than when prosecuted without applying for leniency.19 Payoffs are 
summarized in Table 4.
The timeline is as follows:
 (i) In the first round, which focuses on product 1, the following leniency game is 
played for product  1 :
  (a)  In the first stage, both firms observe signal  s 1 ∈ {0, 1}, where 
 Pr  ( s 1 = 1) = h ∈ (0, 1) . The realization  s 1 = 1 denotes that the 
competition authority has received some evidence about illegal anti-
trust activity in product  1 and has started an investigation, while  s 1 = 0 
means that this has not happened.
  (b)  In the second stage, nothing happens if  s 1 = 0 , but if  s 1 = 1, each firm 
brings in outside counsel to do an internal investigation. The internal 
investigation uncovers evidence sufficient to support a leniency appli-
cation with probability  ρ ∈ (0, 1) , in which case the outside counsel 
observes a conditionally independent random variable  θ i1 uniformly dis-
tributed in the interval  [ τ 1 − ϵ,  τ 1 + ϵ] , where  ϵ > 0, centered on the 
realized value of the random variable  τ 1 , defined below in (d). We will 
think of  ϵ as “small,” so that  τ is “almost” perfectly observed by each 
firm and focus on the limit as  ϵ ↓ 0 .20
19 In the United States, firms receiving leniency may still be subject to penalties from civil litigation; however, 
exposure to those penalties is reduced for successful leniency applicants. “Under the Antitrust Criminal Penalty 
Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, Title 2, §§ 211–214, 118 Stat. 661, 666–668, a leni-
ency applicant may qualify for detrebling of damages if the applicant cooperates with plaintiffs in their civil actions 
while the applicant’s former co-conspirators will remain liable for treble damages on a joint and several basis.” 
(Hammond and Barnett 2008, 18.) 
20 As described in Carlsson and van Damme (1993a), the global game result that iterated dominance forces each 
player to select the risk-dominant equilibrium of the game corresponding to his observation provided that  ϵ is suf-
ficiently small relies only on the posterior beliefs being approximately symmetric (the likelihood that  i assigns to  j 
observing  θ j1 given  θ i1 is approximately equal to the likelihood that  j assigns to  i observing  θ i1 given  θ j1 ). Symmetry 
holds exactly if the prior is uniform but holds approximately for general priors if the observation errors are small. 
Table 4—Payoffs in the Model for Product J
Outcome Payoffs
Not caught  π j 
Caught and granted leniency  −ℓ π j 
Caught and pay fines  −f  π j 
source: Authors’ calculations
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  (c)  In the third stage, nothing happens if  s 1 = 0 or if  s 1 = 1 and the inter-
nal investigation did not uncover evidence sufficient to support a leni-
ency application. But if  s 1 = 1 and the internal investigation did uncover 
such evidence, then the outside counsel advises the board of directors by 
reporting the observed value  θ i1 and the board decides whether to apply 
for leniency or not. If only one firm applies for leniency, it receives leni-
ency. If both firms apply for leniency, one (and only one) is randomly 
designated as receiving leniency.
  (d)  In the fourth stage, the competition authority concludes its investigation 
after observing an additional signal  v 1 ∈ {0, 1}  indicating the strength of 
the case;  v 1 = 1 signifies that the authority has enough evidence to con-
vict the firms, while  v 1 = 0 denotes insufficient evidence and the need 
to drop the case. We assume that  v 1 = 1 if there is at least one leniency 
applicant. If there is no leniency applicant,  Pr  ( v 1 = 1 |  s 1 = 0) = 0 
and  Pr  ( v 1 = 1 |  s 1 = 1) =  τ 1 . From the point of view of the firms, 
τ 1 is a random variable with positive, bounded density  g( τ 1 ) and dis-
tribution  g ( τ 1 ) with support on the interval  (0, 1) ; let  τ E =  ∫ 0 1 τg (τ )   dτ 
be the expected value of  τ 1 .
 (ii) In the second round, which focuses on product 2, we need to distinguish 
between penalty-plus and standard leniency. Under standard leniency, except 
for the probability that the competition authority starts an investigation, the 
same game as in the first round is played for product  2 . We let the probabil-
ity that the competition authority starts an investigation to be  h C ≥ h if in 
the first round firms were convicted, i.e., if  v 1 = 1 and  h otherwise. This 
reflects “cartel profiling;” that is, the conviction in product 1 may cause the 
competition authority to be more attentive to the potential for collusion in 
other products produced by the same firms, increasing the probability of an 
investigation in product 2.21
  Under penalty­plus leniency, if  v 1 = 0, then the game played for product  2 is 
the same as the game for product  1 ; but if  v 1 = 1, then a penalty-plus game is 
played for product  2 , in which firms prosecuted in product  1 are asked about 
potential collusion in product  2 and must decide whether to apply for leni-
ency without having observed the signal  s 2 (i.e., without knowing whether the 
competition authority has received evidence about illegal antitrust activity). 
Firms that deny any involvement in a collusive agreement in product  2 are 
not allowed to apply for leniency at a later stage; e.g., after the  competition 
21 “The [Antitrust] Division [of the DoJ] will target its proactive efforts in industries where we suspect cartel 
activity in adjacent markets or which involve one or more common players from other cartels.” (Hammond 2004, 
15) 
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authority has started an investigation.22 Formally, the  penalty-plus game has 
four stages:
  (a)  In the first stage, each firm brings in outside counsel to do an internal 
investigation. The internal investigation uncovers evidence sufficient to 
support a leniency application with probability  ρ > 0 , in which case the 
outside counsel observes a conditionally independent random variable 
θ i2 centered on the realized value of the random variable  τ 2 , which, for 
simplicity, has the same density and support as  τ 1 .
  (b)  In the second stage, if the internal investigation uncovered evidence suf-
ficient to support a leniency application, then the board decides whether 
to apply for leniency or not.
  (c)  In the third stage, if no firm has applied for leniency, then the competition 
authority receives evidence about illegal antitrust activity,  s 2 = 1, with 
probability  h C .
  (d)  In the fourth stage, the competition authority concludes its investigation 
after observing the additional signal  v 2 ∈ {0, 1} . As in the first round, 
τ 2 = Pr  ( v 2 = 1 |  s 2 = 1) .
In the benchmark case without a leniency program in place, the cartel is con-
victed in the first product with probability  Ψ 1 n = h τ E and in the second product 
with probability  Ψ 2 n = h τ E   h C τ E +  (1 − h τ E )  h τ E . A cartel firm’s expected payoff 
in product  i is  V i n π i , where  V i n = (1 −  Ψ i n ) −  Ψ i n f .
We will use the following three assumptions to reduce the number of cases we 
need to analyze and to focus on the most interesting setting.
ASSUMPTION  A1 :
  ρ <  min   
 { 2 (1 + ℓ)  ________2 + f + ℓ  ,   2 (1 + ℓ)  ________2 + f + ℓ + 2hρ ( 2 (1 + f )   τ 
E   _________
2 + f + ℓ − 1)    π 2  __ π 1 }  . 
ASSUMPTION  A2 :
  h C <  1 + ℓ _____1 + f −  
ρ( f − ℓ)  ____________  
2(2 − ρ) (1 + f )  . 
ASSUMPTION  A3 :
  E [τ | τ > t ] ≤  1 + t ____2  . 
22 Because, as we shall prove in Proposition 2, firms never apply for leniency in the second product under 
penalty-plus leniency, if we allowed firms to apply for leniency after an investigation has started, then penalty-plus 
leniency would be equivalent to standard leniency. 
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Assumption  A1 puts an upper bound on the value that  ρ can take. Note that it 
implies that
(1)  ρ <  2 (1 + ℓ)  ________
2 + f + ℓ  . 
Indeed, most of our results only require that condition (1) holds. The full force of 
Assumption  A1 is only needed in Proposition 4 (and Lemma 3), to guarantee that 
under a penalty-plus program for some parameter values it is optimal for firms not 
to apply for leniency in the first product.
Assumption  A2 puts an upper bound on the probability  h C , and consequently  h , 
that the competition authority acquires evidence of collusion on its own. It will be 
used in Proposition 2 to show that firms never apply for leniency when the penal-
ty-plus leniency game is played in product  2 after a conviction in product  1 .
Assumption  A3 is a restriction on the right tail of the distribution of  τ ; note that it 
is satisfied by the uniform and other common distributions. Assumption  A3 is used 
to prove Lemma 2, parts ( ii ) and ( iii ), and Lemma 3.
III. Second Product Equilibrium
Using backward induction, we begin by considering the second product coming 
to the attention of the competition authority. We need to distinguish the standard 
leniency setting from the case of penalty-plus leniency after a first period convic-
tion. The difference between the two is that after a conviction in the first-market, 
under penalty-plus a firm must decide whether to apply for leniency before the com-
petition authority starts an investigation.
In both cases, firms must decide whether to apply for leniency after having con-
ducted an internal investigation. If a firm does not uncover evidence, then it has no 
choice to make; it cannot apply for leniency. After uncovering evidence, a firm faces 
a strategic game (the basic leniency game). The firm (the row player) must decide 
whether to apply for leniency ( L ) or not ( n ) , and its payoff depends on whether the 
other firm (the column player) applies for leniency in case it has uncovered evi-
dence. The payoff of the row player is given by adding the baseline payoff  −f  π 2 to 
the entries in (2) below:23
(2) L n
L  (1 −  ρ _2)   π 2 ( f − ℓ)  π 2 ( f − ℓ) 
n  (1 − ρ) (1 − β θ i2 )   π 2 (1 + f )  (1 − β   θ i2 )   π 2 (1 + f ) 
The perceived probability of successful prosecution in case of no leniency appli-
cation is  β θ i2 , where  β = 1 in the case of standard leniency or penalty-plus without 
23 The symmetry of firms does not play any role in the game; we could replace  π 2 with a different payoff  π 2i for 
each firm  i without affecting the analysis. 
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a first market conviction (because in those cases the firms only decide whether to 
apply for leniency after having observed that the competition authority has started 
an investigation), and where  β =  h C in the case of penalty-plus after a conviction 
in the first market (because in this case firms must decide whether to apply for 
leniency before the competition authority starts an investigation, which will happen 
with probability  h C ).
We can think of  −f π 2 , the firm’s payoff when prosecuted and fined, as the base-
line payoff of the row player. If the row player applies for leniency, then it receives 
leniency and a payoff of  π 2 ( f − ℓ) above the baseline if the other firm does not 
apply after uncovering evidence (upper right cell). It receives leniency and a payoff 
of  π 2 ( f − ℓ) above the baseline with probability  1 −  ρ _2 if the other firm does apply 
after uncovering evidence (upper left cell). This is because the only event in which 
the applying firm does not receive leniency is when the other firm uncovers evidence 
(which occurs with probability  ρ ), applies, and is selected to receive leniency by the 
random draw  (which occurs with probability  1 _2) .
When the row player does not apply for leniency, it is not prosecuted and receives 
a payoff of  π 2 (1 + f ) above the baseline  −f π 2 with probability  1 − β θ i2 if the other 
firm does not apply after uncovering evidence (lower right cell) and with probability 
(1 − ρ) (1 − β θ i2 ) if the other firm applies for leniency after uncovering evidence 
(lower left cell).
Based on the basic leniency game, we can distinguish between the following 
four cases:
• Applying for leniency is a strictly dominant strategy and  (L, L) is the unique 
Nash equilibrium. This holds if and only if
 (3)           β θ i2 >  1 + ℓ _____1 + f  . 
• There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria  (L, L) and  (n, n), and equilibrium 
(L, L) is risk dominant. Because the basic leniency game is symmetric,  ( L, L ) 
is risk dominant if  L is the best reply to the opponent’s strategy of randomizing 
with equal probability between  L and  n . This holds if and only if
 (4)     1 + ℓ _____
1 + f −  
ρ ( f − ℓ)   ____________  
2(2 − ρ) (1 + f ) < β θ i2 <  
1 + ℓ _____
1 + f  . 
• There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria  (L, L) and  (n, n), and  (n, n) is risk 
dominant. This holds if and only if
 (5)  1 + ℓ _____
1 + f −  
ρ ( f − ℓ)   ____________  
2(1 − ρ) (1 + f ) < β θ i2 <  
1 + ℓ _____
1 + f −  
ρ ( f − ℓ)   ____________  
2(2 − ρ) (1 + f )  . 
• No leniency is a dominant strategy and  (n, n) is the unique Nash equilibrium. 
This holds if and only if
 (6)        β θ i2 <  1 + ℓ _____1 + f −  
ρ ( f − ℓ)   ____________  
2(1 − ρ) (1 + f )  . 
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We see from condition (3) that if the punishment for being convicted without 
a leniency application is sufficiently severe, i.e.,  f is sufficiently large, then apply-
ing for leniency is a dominant strategy, as long as being convicted is possible, i.e., 
θ i2 > 0 . The assumption that  f is large may be appropriate if, for example, collud-
ing firms can be held jointly and severally liable or damages tripled or to account for 
prison sentences for managers.
We see from condition (6) that, without enough probability  β θ i2 that the compe-
tition authority prosecutes the cartel in the absence of a leniency application, it is 
a dominant strategy for firms not to apply for leniency. This provides a modeling 
foundation for the view that for leniency to work it is important that, in the words 
of Wils (2008a, 130), “the companies and individuals concerned perceive a risk that 
the competition authorities will detect and establish the antitrust violation without 
recourse to leniency.”
When there is a threat of prosecution in the absence of a leniency application, 
the threat that a co-conspirator may apply increases leniency applications. If it 
were known that the rival could not apply for leniency, perhaps because it would 
be viewed as a ringleader or coercing others to join and so not eligible for leniency, 
then the firm applies for leniency if and only if  β θ i2 >  1 + ℓ ____1 + f . However, as shown 
below, with the threat that a co-conspirator may apply, a firm applies for leniency 
for the larger range of values  β θ i2 >  1 + ℓ ____1 + f −  
ρ ( f − ℓ) __________  
2(2 − ρ) (1 + f ) . Thus, a “race to the 
courthouse” can amplify the incentive for a colluding firm to apply for leniency.
A. standard Leniency in the second Product
Because we are interested in the case of a small error in the observation by firm 
i of the probability of successful prosecution,  θ i2 is approximately equal to  τ 2 . 
Assumption  A1 guarantees that in the case of standard leniency, or penalty-plus with 
no prior conviction, when  β = 1 , the parameter configuration does not rule out any 
of the four equilibrium cases. For high values of  τ 2, the leniency program is cer-
tainly effective and for low values of  τ 2 , the leniency program is ineffective; more 
formally, (3) holds for  θ i2 sufficiently close to one and (6) holds for  θ i2 sufficiently 
close to zero because by Assumption  A1, inequality (1) holds and, as a result, the 
right side of (6) is positive.
We can think of the signal  θ i2 received by firm  i as  i ’s type. The strategy of firm 
i can then by represented as the probability  α i2 ( θ i2 ) with which the firm chooses 
pure strategy  L after observing signal  θ i2 . Define the cut-off value for the probabil-
ity of prosecution below which  ( n, n ) is risk dominant and above which  ( L, L ) is 
risk-dominant in the basic leniency game by
(7)  τ 2 ∗ ≡ 1 −  
 (4 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   ____________
2(2 − ρ) (1 + f )  > 0 . 
We are now in a position to prove the following result, which exploits the fact that 
τ 2 is a random variable that is imperfectly observed by the firms. The proof is con-
tained in Appendix A, as are all other proofs.
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PROPOSITION 1: under Assumption  A1 , with standard leniency or penalty­plus 
with no prior conviction, in the basic leniency game for product  2 , for  ϵ sufficiently 
small, the subgame taking place after a signal  s 2 = 1 has a unique Bayesian 
equilibrium that survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. 
in such an equilibrium, when firm  i uncovers evidence, it applies for leniency 
(i.e.,  α i2 ( θ i2 ) = 1 ) if it receives a signal  θ i2 >  τ 2 ∗, and does not apply (i.e., 
 α i2 ( θ i2 ) = 0 ) if it receives a signal  θ i2 <  τ 2 ∗.
As Proposition 1 shows, depending on the signals firms receive, firms for which 
leniency is feasible may choose to apply for leniency or may not. Henceforth, when 
computing payoffs and probabilities of successful prosecution, we take the limit as 
ϵ ↓ 0 , with the implication that the firms coordinate on either both applying for 
leniency when that is feasible or both not applying for leniency.
The ex ante probability that the cartel will be convicted in the basic leniency 
game is
(8)  Ψ 2i s =  h 2 [1 −  (1 − ρ) 2 (1 −  τ E ) − ρ (2 − ρ)   ∫ 0  τ 2 
∗
 (1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ ] ,  
where  h 2 = h and  Ψ 2i s =  Ψ 2B s if there was no conviction in product  1 , while 
 h 2 =  h C and  Ψ 2i s =  Ψ 2C s otherwise. To understand this expression, note that, condi-
tional on the competition authority acquiring evidence, which occurs with probabil-
ity  h 2 , the cartel is not convicted if neither firm finds evidence to apply for leniency 
and then the competition authority is unable to convict, which occurs with proba-
bility  (1 − ρ) 2 (1 −  τ E ) —the second term in the square brackets—or if at least one 
firm finds evidence (probability  ρ(2 − ρ) ) but  τ is less than  τ 2 ∗ and the authority is 
unable to convict—the last term in the square brackets.
The expected payoff of a cartel firm from a basic leniency game in product  2 is 
V 2i sπ 2 , where
(9)  V 2i s = 1 −  Ψ 2i s (1 + f ) +  h 2 ρ (1 −  ρ __2)   ( f − ℓ)   (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) ) ,  
where  V 2i s is denoted as  V 2B s or  V 2C s depending on whether  h 2 = h or  h 2 =  h C . 
Note that a firm gets  π 2 with probability  1 −  Ψ 2i s and a baseline payoff of  −f π 2 
with probability  Ψ 2i s ; in addition, it gets  ( f − ℓ)   π 2 if it is the only firm to apply for 
leniency  (probability  h 2 [ρ(1 − ρ) +  1 _2ρ 2 ]  Pr  (τ >  τ 2 ∗) ) , which generates the last 
term in (9).
The next lemma follows from  h C ≥ h .
LEMMA 1: under Assumption  A1,  Ψ 2C s ≥  Ψ 2B s and  V 2B s ≥  V 2C s  . 
B. Penalty­Plus in the second Product
If the penalty-plus leniency game is played in product  2 after firms have been 
convicted in product 1, then firms uncovering sufficient evidence from an  internal 
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investigation must decide whether to apply for leniency before the competition 
authority has collected any incriminating evidence; that is, before observing the sig-
nal  s 2 . Because  h C is the probability that  s 2 = 1 , this game corresponds to the case 
β =  h C , so that  β θ i2 is approximately equal to  h C    τ 2 .
Under Assumptions  A1 and  A2 , for some parameter values  n is a dominant strat-
egy, while for others it is the risk dominant strategy; strategy  L is never dominant or 
risk dominant. More precisely, (6) holds for  θ i2 sufficiently close to zero, while by 
Assumption  A2 , (3) and (4) never hold.24 We may now state the main result of this 
subsection.
PROPOSITION 2: under Assumptions  A1 and  A2 , for  ϵ sufficiently small, with 
a penalty­plus program after a first­market conviction, the penalty­plus game for 
product  2 has a unique Bayesian equilibrium that survives the iterated elimination 
of strictly dominated strategies. in that equilibrium, no firm applies for leniency, 
 α i2 ( θ i2 ) = 0 , for all  θ i2  . 
Since firms will not apply for leniency, it is straightforward to compute the prob-
ability that the cartel will be convicted in the penalty-plus game:
(10)  Ψ 2C P =  h C   τ E  . 
The expected payoff of a cartel firm from a penalty-plus leniency game in product 
2 is  V 2C P π 2 , where
(11)  V 2C P = 1 −  Ψ 2C P (1 + f )  . 
The next lemma shows that after a conviction in the first product, the probability 
of successful prosecution is greater and the expected payoff to the cartel is lower 
under standard leniency than in the penalty-plus regime; following a conviction, 
firms prefer penalty-plus to standard leniency. In addition, as long as the probability 
ratio  h C  / h is below a threshold  r ∗ =  min  { r A ∗,  r B ∗} > 1 , the probability of pros-
ecution is greater and the expected cartel payoff lower in the basic game with no 
previous conviction, than in the penalty-plus game; in this case, even without a prior 
conviction, the colluding firms prefer penalty-plus.
LEMMA 2: under Assumptions  A1 and  A2 : 
 (i) There exists a threshold  r A ∗ > 1, such that the probability that the cartel will 
be convicted is lower in the  penalty­plus game than in the basic game without 
a prior conviction, i.e.,  Ψ 2C P <  Ψ 2B s , if and only if  h C /h <  r A ∗; 
24 This conclusion remains true if the competition authority could increase the fine multiplier  f by a small 
amount in case a firm is convicted of colluding in product 2 after having denied doing it. If  f could be increased with-
out bound, then a firm may find it optimal to apply for leniency and Proposition 2 would no longer hold. However, 
in practice sentencing guidelines restrict the ability of competition authorities to impose fines above some upper 
bound. On the other hand, without the upper bound on the probability  h C imposed by Assumption  A2 , Proposition 2 
would not hold and there could be leniency applications in product 2. 
VoL. 7 no. 3 221marx et al.: antitrust leniency with multiproduct colluders
 (ii) if, in addition, Assumption  A3 holds, then there exists a  threshold  r B ∗ > 1, 
such that the cartel’s expected payoff is higher in the penalty­plus game than 
in the basic game without a prior conviction, i.e.,  V 2C P >  V 2B s , if and only if 
h C  / h <  r B ∗; 
 (iii) After a conviction in the first product, relative to standard leniency under 
penalty­plus, the probability that the cartel will be convicted in product  2 is 
lower,  Ψ 2C P <  Ψ 2C s , and if, in addition, Assumption  A3 holds, then the car­
tel’s payoff is higher,  V 2C P >  V 2C s  . 
IV. Multiproduct Equilibrium
In this section we study firms’ decisions in the first product after their activity has 
come under investigation by the competition authority. The payoff of the row player 
in the first product game is given by adding the baseline payoff  −f  π 1 +  V 2i   π 2 to the 
entries in (12); the second period payoff multiplier  V 2i is equal to  V 2C s in the case of 
standard leniency, and it is equal to  V 2C P in the case of penalty-plus leniency.25
(12) L n
L  (1 −  
ρ
 _
2)   π 1 ( f − ℓ)  π 1 ( f − ℓ) 
n  (1 − ρ) (1 −  θ i1 )  · [  π 1 (1 + f ) +  ( V 2B s −  V 2i ) π 2 ]  (1 −  θ i1 )  · [  π 1 (1 + f ) +  ( V 2B s −  V 2i ) π 2 ] 
The payoffs of the period 1 leniency game correspond to payoff of the basic 
leniency game (2) with  β = 1, once we add the baseline payoff  −f  π 1 +  V 2i   π 2 
to the entries in all cells and we replace  π 2 with  π 1 in the first row,  π 2 (1 + f ) with 
π 1 (1 + f ) +  ( V 2B s −  V 2i )   π 2 in the second row, and  θ i2 with  θ i1 , which is approxi-
mately equal to  τ 1 . If a firm applies for leniency in product 1, it guarantees itself 
a second product payoff of  π 2 V 2i . If a conviction has not taken place in the first 
product, then the continuation payoff in the second product is  V 2B s π 2 . Thus, we can 
think of  π 1 (1 + f ) +  ( V 2B s −  V 2i )   π 2 as the firm’s net payoff if it does not apply for 
leniency and it is not prosecuted in product  1 .
We now distinguish between the standard leniency and the penalty-plus regime.
A. standard Leniency in the Multiproduct game
With standard leniency, after a conviction in the first product, each firm 
has an expected payoff in the second product of  V 2C s   π 2 . Thus, in this case 
 V 2i =  V 2C s in (12).
25 It is not essential that the firms belonging to the cartel in the first product are involved in the same sec-
ond-product cartel. The important ingredient of the model is that there is a second-product continuation payoff; that 
is, that the firms in the first-product cartel are also involved in cartels for other, possibly different, products with 
other, possibly different, firms. 
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Following the same logic used to derive (3)–(6), we can show that under 
Assumption  A1, the parameter configuration does not rule out any of the four equi-
librium cases. This is because if  θ i1 is sufficiently close to one, then  L is a domi-
nant strategy, while if  θ i1 is sufficiently close to zero, then  n is a dominant strategy 
because  V 2B s ≥  V 2C s by Lemma 1 and, by Assumption  A1 , inequality (1) holds. 
We can also define the cut-off value for the probability of prosecution below which 
( n, n ) is risk dominant, and above which  ( L, L ) is risk dominant:
(13)  τ 1B ∗ ≡ 1 −  
 (4 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)    __________________________ 
2 (2 − ρ)   [1 + f +  ( V 2B s −  V 2C s )    π 2  __ π 1 ] 
 ,  
where  τ 1B ∗ ≥  τ 2 ∗ because  V 2B s ≥  V 2C s .
PROPOSITION 3: under Assumption  A1 , for  ϵ sufficiently small, the model with 
a standard leniency program has a unique Bayesian equilibrium that survives the 
iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. When it uncovers evidence in 
the first product, firm  i applies for leniency (i.e.,  α i1 ( θ i1 ) = 1 ) if it receives signal 
 θ i1 >  τ 1B ∗ , and does not apply (i.e.,  α i1 ( θ i1 ) = 0 ) if it receives signal  θ i1 <  τ 1B ∗ . in 
the second product, firms conduct an investigation only if the competition author­
ity has received some evidence of collusion (i.e., following  s 2 = 1 ); when firm  i 
uncovers evidence, it applies for leniency (i.e.,  α i2 ( θ i2 ) = 1 ) if it receives signal 
 θ i2 >  τ 2 ∗, and does not apply (i.e.,  α i2 ( θ i2 ) = 0 ) if it receives signal  θ i2 <  τ 2 ∗ . 
Proposition 3 shows that, conditional on the competition authority uncovering 
some evidence of collusion (i.e.,  s 1 = 1 and  s 2 = 1 ), the firms apply for leniency 
in product  1 with lower probability than in product  2 . This is due to cartel profiling, 
the fact that  h C ≥ h , which in turn implies  τ 1B ∗ ≥  τ 2 ∗. The probability that some 
firm applies for leniency in product  1 is  ρ(2 − ρ) (1 − g ( τ 1B ∗ ) ) , while the probabil-
ity that some firm applies for leniency in product  2 is  ρ(2 − ρ) (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) ) .
We now define the ex ante probability that the cartel will be prosecuted and con-
victed in the first product:
(14)  Ψ 1 s = h [1 −  (1 − ρ) 2 (1 −  τ E ) − ρ(2 − ρ) ∫ 0  τ 1B 
∗  (1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ ]  . 
In the multi-product game, the ex ante probability that the cartel will be prosecuted 
and convicted in the second product is
(15)  Ψ 2 s =  Ψ 1 sΨ 2C s + (1 −  Ψ 1 s) Ψ 2B s . 
The expected payoff from the first product in the multi-product game is  V 1 s  π 1 , where
(16)  V 1 s = 1 −  Ψ 1 s(1 + f ) +  1 _2 hρ (2 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   (1 − g ( τ 1B ∗ ) )  . 
The total payoff in the multi-product game is  V s π 1 , where
(17)  V s =  V 1 s +  Ψ 1 s  V 2C s    π 2  __ π 1 + (1 −  Ψ 1 
s) V 2B s    π 2  __ π 1  . 
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B. Penalty­Plus in the Multiproduct game
In the case of penalty-plus, under Assumptions  A1 and  A2, after a conviction in 
the first product, each firm has an expected payoff in the second product of  V 2C P   π 2 . 
Thus, in this case  V 2i =  V 2C P in (12).
If, in addition, Assumption  A3 holds, then it is also true in this case that the 
parameter configuration does not rule out any of the four equilibrium cases. As 
before, if  θ i1 is sufficiently close to one, then  L is a dominant strategy, while if  θ i1 
is sufficiently close to zero, then Assumptions  A1 – A3 imply that  n is a dominant 
strategy, as shown in Lemma 3 in the Appendix.
The cut-off value for the probability of prosecution below which  ( n, n ) is risk 
dominant and above which  ( L, L ) is risk-dominant is given by
(18)  τ 1P ∗ ≡ 1 −  
 (4 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)    __________________________ 
2 (2 − ρ)   [1 + f +  ( V 2B s −  V 2C P )    π 2  __ π 1 ] 
  . 
One can show that  τ 1P ∗ <  τ 1B ∗ because  V 2C P >  V 2C s by Lemma 2. Furthermore, 
one can show that  τ 1P ∗ <  τ 2 ∗ if and only if  V 2C P >  V 2B s , that is, if and only if  h C  / h is 
below the threshold  r B ∗ defined in Lemma 2.
PROPOSITION 4: under Assumptions  A1 – A3, for  ϵ sufficiently small, the model 
with penalty­plus has a unique Bayesian equilibrium that survives the iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. When firm  i uncovers evidence in 
the first product, it applies for leniency (i.e.,  α i1 ( θ i1 ) = 1 ) if it receives signal 
 θ i1 >  τ 1P ∗ , and does not apply (i.e.,  α i1 ( θ i1 ) = 0 ) if it receives signal  θ i1 <  τ 1P ∗ . 
if firms are not prosecuted in the first product (i.e., if  v 1 = 0 ), then in the second, 
product firms conduct an investigation only if the competition authority has received 
some evidence of collusion (i.e., following  s 2 = 1 ); when firm  i uncovers evidence, 
it applies for leniency (i.e.,  α i2 ( θ i2 ) = 1 ) if it receives signal  θ i2 >  τ 2 ∗, and does 
not apply (i.e.,  α i2 ( θ i2 ) = 0 ) if it receives signal  θ i2 <  τ 2 ∗ . if firms are prosecuted 
in the first product (i.e., if  v 1 = 1 ), then in the second product neither firm applies 
for leniency.
Proposition 4 completes our analysis of the equilibrium of the game and shows 
that, conditional on the competition authority uncovering some evidence of col-
lusion (i.e.,  s 1 = 1 ), the firms apply for leniency in product  1 with higher proba-
bility under penalty-plus than standard leniency. With penalty-plus, the probability 
that some firm applies for leniency in product 1 is  ρ(2 − ρ) (1 − g ( τ 1P ∗ ) ) , while 
with standard leniency it is  ρ(2 − ρ) (1 − g ( τ 1B ∗ ) ) ; the latter is lower because 
 τ 1B ∗ >  τ 1P ∗ .
In addition, even if firms are not convicted in product  1 , if  h C  / h is below the 
threshold  r B ∗, then conditional on the competition authority uncovering some evi-
dence of collusion (i.e.,  s 1 = 1 and  s 2 = 1 ), the firms apply for leniency in product 
1 with higher probability than in product  2 because  τ 1P ∗ <  τ 2 ∗.
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We now define the ex ante probabilities  Ψ 1 P and  Ψ 2 P that the cartel will be prose-
cuted and convicted in the first and second product:
(19)   Ψ 1 P = h [1 −  (1 − ρ) 2 (1 −  τ E ) − ρ(2 − ρ) ∫ 0  τ 1P 
∗  (1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ ] ,  
(20)  Ψ 2 P =  Ψ 1 PΨ 2C P + (1 −  Ψ 1 P) Ψ 2B s . 
The expected payoff from the first product in the multiproduct game is  V 1 P π 1 , where
(21)  V 1 P = 1 −  Ψ 1 P(1 + f ) +  1 _2 hρ (2 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   (1 − g ( τ 1P ∗ ) )  . 
The total payoff in the multiproduct game is  V P π 1 , where
(22)  V P =  V 1 P +  Ψ 1 P  V 2C P    π 2  __ π 1 + (1 −  Ψ 1 
P) V 2B s    π 2  __ π 1  . 
V. Policy Implications
In this section, we describe several policy implications emerging from our model.
A. Leniency Contributes to Prosecution and Preemption Effects
As shown in Propositions 1– 4, assuming the cartel firms receive accurate sig-
nals on the probability of prosecution in the absence of a leniency applicant, once 
a cartel comes under investigation, firms apply for leniency whenever the prob-
ability of prosecution without a leniency applicant,  τ, is greater than a threshold 
( τ 1B ∗ ,  τ 1P ∗ , or  τ 2 ∗), except in the penalty-plus environment after having been convicted 
in the first product, in which case the firms do not apply for leniency. The thresholds 
differ depending on the leniency environment and whether it is the first or second 
product. In product 1, the threshold is  τ 1B ∗ for standard leniency and  τ 1P ∗ for penal-
ty-plus. In product 2, the threshold is  τ 2 ∗ for standard leniency or penalty-plus with 
no conviction in the first product, and essentially equal to 1 for penalty-plus with a 
conviction because the firms never apply for leniency in that case.
We can analyze the game in terms of the prosecution and preemption effects 
created by leniency (see Harrington 2013). If  τ is sufficiently large that  L is the 
dominant strategy, then a firm will seek leniency even if it expects that the other firm 
will not. This is the prosecution effect. Firms have an incentive to apply for leniency 
in order to avoid the penalties associated with being prosecuted, which for high  τ is 
relatively likely even in the absence of a leniency applicant. If  τ is in the range where 
there are two Nash equilibria of the complete information game, but  L is the risk 
dominant strategy, then a firm will seek leniency because it expects the other firm to 
apply for leniency. This is the preemption effect. A firm only prefers leniency as a 
means to preempt the leniency application of the other firm.
We can define the strength of the prosecution effect to be the probability that  τ 
is in the region where  L is a dominant strategy and the strength of the preemption 
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effect to be the probability that  τ is in the region where  L is not dominant but is a 
risk dominant strategy. Using this definition, we can examine the effect of leniency 
on the prosecution and preemption effects.
PROPOSITION 5: under Assumptions  A1 – A3 , the strength of the prosecution and 
preemption effects increase as the payoff under leniency increases ( ℓ decreases): 
 (i) for the second product except in the penalty­plus environment after having 
been convicted in the first product, in which case there is no effect, and 
 (ii) for the first product when   π 2  __ π 1 is sufficiently small or  h C is sufficiently close 
to  h .
As shown in Proposition 5, in the environment with standard leniency, there is a 
double benefit on the probability of leniency in the first product from a more gener-
ous leniency program, which corresponds to a lower value of  ℓ , because a decrease 
in  ℓ results in an increase in both the prosecution and the preemption effects.26
B. The Effectiveness of internal investigations increases the Preemption Effect
An increase in the probability that an internal investigation uncovers evidence,  ρ , 
means that a firm that has itself uncovered evidence sufficient to apply for leniency 
believes it is more likely that its co-conspirator will be in a similar position. This can 
increase the preemption effect.
PROPOSITION 6: under Assumptions  A1 – A3 , the strength of the preemption 
effect increases as the probability  ρ that an internal investigation uncovers evidence 
increases: 
 (i) for the second product except in the penalty­plus environment after having 
been convicted in the first product, in which case there is no effect, and 
 (ii) for the first product when   π 2  __ π 1 is sufficiently small or  h C is sufficiently close 
to  h .
If it is more likely that a co-conspirator has maintained incriminating evidence in 
house, then one would expect  ρ to increase, and so as shown by Proposition 6 a firm 
has a greater incentive to apply for leniency. This suggests that leniency programs 
can be made more effective if the competition authority can take steps that enhance 
incentives for employees with knowledge of the conspiracy to cooperate and that 
facilitate the discovery of incriminating evidence, for example, by limiting the abil-
ity of cartels to outsource the running of the cartel and control of incriminating 
evidence to third-party facilitators.
26 See Harrington (2013) on the “multiplier effect” of a more aggressive competition authority. 
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C. Penalty­Plus May reduce Detection
In our model, under a penalty-plus leniency program firms have an additional 
incentive to apply for leniency in the first product. Conviction in the first product 
delivers the benefit to the cartel of committing the firms not to apply for leniency in 
the second product because that is the unique equilibrium of the penalty-plus game. 
As a result, penalty-plus leniency increases convictions in the first product, but it 
decreases convictions in the second product relative to standard leniency unless car-
tel profiling is so severe that after a conviction in the first product it is very likely 
that the competition authority will also start an investigation in the second product.
PROPOSITION 7: under Assumptions  A1 – A3, relative to standard leniency, under 
a penalty­plus leniency program: 
 (i) firms are ex ante more likely to be convicted in the first product,  Ψ 1 P >  Ψ 1 s;
 (ii) if  h C  / h <  r A ∗, where  r A ∗ is the threshold defined in Lemma  2 , then firms are 
ex ante less likely to be convicted in the second product,  Ψ 2 P <  Ψ 2 s; and 
 (iii) if  h C /h <  r B ∗, where  r B ∗ is the threshold defined in Lemma  2 and the ratio 
 π 2  /  π 1 is above a threshold  ( π 2  /  π 1 ) ∗ , then firms ex ante payoffs are higher 
under penalty­plus than under standard leniency,  V P π 1 >  V s π 1  . 
Proposition 7 tells us that in our model in the absence of extreme cartel profiling, 
penalty-plus leniency generates a trade-off. It increases the probability of a convic-
tion in the first product and decreases it in the second product. In addition, if the 
second product is sufficiently more profitable than the first product, then firms prefer 
penalty-plus to standard leniency. This suggests that the competition authority has 
an incentive to attend to the more profitable product first, while, on the contrary, 
firms engaged in collusion in multiple products may have an incentive to manip-
ulate the order in which products are approached by the competition authority to 
the extent that is possible, potentially engaging in collusion in a minor product and 
revealing the existence of the cartel in order to decrease the probability of prosecu-
tion in the more valuable product.
Thus, penalty-plus can potentially cause more cartels to form than under standard 
leniency. In particular, minor products that were not worth cartelizing with standard 
leniency, perhaps because the incremental value from cartelization was insufficient 
given the costs of establishing the required collusive structures, may be worth car-
telizing in an environment with penalty-plus leniency because the additional, sac-
rificial, cartels provide the potential benefit of insulating more valuable products 
from leniency applications. These undesirable effects can potentially be avoided 
by directing additional resources towards the investigation of potential collusion in 
other products produced by firms found to be engaged in collusion, with the effect 
of increasing  h C  / h .
Other leniency policies also offer a type of commitment device similar to 
 penalty-plus, which can be similarly abused by strategic multiproduct cartels. Chen 
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and Rey (2013) show that in their model prohibiting leniency for repeat offenders 
can reduce the effectiveness of leniency and increase the profitability of collusion. 
For example, Greece used to have the policy that firms with prior convictions for 
collusion could not apply for leniency.27 In this environment, firms have an incen-
tive to collude and get convicted in a less valuable product to protect a more valuable 
one. Certain jurisdictions restrict the ability of firms identified as “ringleaders” or 
firms having “coerced” others into participation to apply for leniency. This suggests 
the possibility that cartels may fabricate evidence that one, or perhaps all, of the 
cartel firms are ringleaders or coercers, in order to prevent leniency from being an 
option for those firms.
D. Profiling May reduce Detection
We have assumed that the probability of investigation is  h in the first product and 
is  h C in the second product following a conviction in the first product, with  h C ≥ h . 
By allowing  h C to be greater than  h, we allow the possibility that the competition 
authority responds to a conviction by increasing the intensity with which it pursues 
the other products of convicted colluders, which can be viewed as “profiling.” 28
Clearly, holding fixed firm behavior with respect to leniency in the first product, 
the greater is  h C , the greater is the probability of conviction in the second product. 
However,  h C also affects firms’ first-stage leniency choice. Indeed, by reducing the 
incentive that firms have to apply for leniency (i.e., decreasing the range of values of 
τ 1 for which the firms apply for leniency in the first product), profiling reduces the 
probability of a conviction in the first product. As long as  h C is sufficiently close to 
h , the reduced probability of conviction in the first product is not sufficient to lead to 
a reduced ex ante probability of conviction in the second product.
PROPOSITION 8: under Assumptions  A1 – A3, an increase in the probability  h C 
of an investigation in the second product after conviction in the first due to cartel 
profiling: 
 (i) decreases the ex ante probability of conviction in the first product under both 
standard leniency and penalty­plus leniency,  
∂  Ψ 1 s ___∂  h C < 0 and  
∂  Ψ 1 P ___∂  h C < 0 ; 
 (ii) increases the ex ante probability of conviction in the second product if  h C is suf­
ficiently close to  h under standard leniency,  
∂  Ψ 2 s ___∂  h C > 0, and if  h C  / h <  r A 
∗, where  r A ∗
is the threshold defined in Lemma  2 , under penalty­plus leniency,  
∂  Ψ 2 P ___∂  h C > 0 .
The competition authority faces a trade-off. Profiling makes a leniency application 
in the first product less appealing and hence reduces convictions in the first product, 
27 See Wils (2008a, 138–139). 
28 The economics literature has analyzed profiling in law enforcement, primarily with regard to the issue of 
racial profiling (e.g., Knowles, Persico, and Todd 2001 and Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee 2010). Harcourt (2006) 
points out how profiling can have perverse effects on crime rates. 
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but it increases convictions in the second product. Thus, under penalty-plus, profil-
ing may be a useful countermeasure against concerns that firms may form sacrificial 
cartels in less valuable products, as discussed in the previous subsection, in order 
to shelter more valuable products from leniency applications. In general, profiling 
makes it more appealing for a competition authority to start by investigating cartels 
in less valuable markets.
E. Antitrust resources for investigation and Prosecution Are Complementary
Competition authorities may be able to choose whether to direct resources 
toward more preliminary investigations or towards more successful prosecutions 
without a leniency applicant. Focusing on the case of a single product (product  2 ), 
we consider a small increase in the probability of an investigation  h 2 and a first 
order stochastic shift in the probability of prosecution in the absence of a leniency 
application  τ 2 . Unsurprisingly, both increase the probability of conviction; more 
interestingly, we show that resources spent in the two activities are complementary.
PROPOSITION 9: under Assumption  A1 , with a leniency program in a single prod­
uct, an increase in the probability of investigation ( h 2 ), and a first order stochastic 
shift in the probability of prosecution in the absence of a leniency applicant ( τ 2 ) 
both increase the ex ante probability of conviction  Ψ 2i s . resources spent in inves­
tigation and prosecution are complementary, as a first order stochastic shift in the 
probability of prosecution  τ 2 increases  ∂  Ψ 2i 
s  ___∂  h 2  , the marginal impact on the probability 
of conviction of an increase in the probability of investigation.
If the competition authority eliminates resources directed at investigations, then 
no cartels are identified and no firms apply for leniency. If the competition authority 
eliminates resources directed at the prosecution of cartels under investigation, but 
without a leniency applicant, then there is no threat to induce firms to apply for 
leniency and so no prosecutions. In order for a leniency program to be effective, the 
competition authority must maintain resources directed at both investigations and 
the prosecution of cartels where there is no leniency applicant.
The probability of investigations can potentially be increased through increased 
monitoring and reporting requirements that allow the competition authority to more 
easily identify anomalies. The probability of successful prosecution in the absence 
of a corporate leniency applicant can potentially be increased by encouraging whis-
tleblowers (see Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic 2006) or allowing individual leniency 
applicants, although one would need to consider whether the evidence provided by 
a whistleblower or individual applicant would be as extensive or as valuable in terms 
of facilitating prosecution as that of a corporate applicant.29
29 In our model, we focus on responses by firms to an investigation (type B leniency). Based on interviews with 
defense attorneys, in the United States, individual leniency does not come up very often. 
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VI. Conclusion
The US antitrust leniency program has been in place in roughly its current form 
since 1993. The past 20 years have given colluding firms an opportunity to adjust 
their behavior to account for the presence of the leniency program. We should 
expect colluding firms to optimize given the existence of leniency. Our results point 
to the possibility that colluding firms might turn to their advantage an enforcement 
approach that links the availability of leniency across products for firms engaged in 
collusion in multiple products. Our model raises the possibility that firms might cre-
ate sacrificial cartels in minor products in order to protect cartels in more valuable 
products from the threat that a cartel member might apply for leniency.
The results and insights we derived in this paper apply more generally to any situ-
ation where a group of agents in a coalition face an external threat to the stability of 
their relationship. Take for example crime gangs and criminal organizations.
In the United States, during a criminal investigation, which may involve sev-
eral potential crimes, an individual may refuse to cooperate by appealing to the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. To combat organized crime, 
government attorneys have several tools at their disposal that resemble corporate 
leniency. First, they may enter into a nonprosecution agreement in exchange for an 
individual’s cooperation. Second, they may agree to reduce the charges against the 
individual.30 Third, they may seek “use immunity,” which requires the individual to 
testify or provide information, but promises not to use that against the individual.31
It is well known that crime gangs typically require members to pass some initi-
ation procedure that involves committing a crime. Like applying for leniency in a 
sacrificial cartel, such an initiation procedure raises the cost of defecting and is a 
form of commitment to be loyal to the gang in the future.
A number of policy implications follow from the results of this paper. We focus 
on antitrust leniency, but they could be stated to apply more widely. Competition 
authorities should (1) use leniency programs to enhance the detection of cartels; 
(2) take steps to improve the likelihood that internal investigations into possible 
antitrust offenses will be successful, including steps that enhance cooperation by 
employees and facilitate the discovery of incriminating evidence; (3) avoid pol-
icies that offer avenues for firms to commit themselves not to apply for leniency 
and, in general, use care when linking leniency procedures for firms participating 
in cartels in multiple products; (4) consider directing additional resources toward 
the investigation of potential collusion in other products produced by firms found 
to be engaged in collusion; and (5) maintain resources to investigate and uncover 
cartels as well as resources to prosecute cartels even in the absence of a leniency 
applicant. The overarching lesson is to consider how clever cartels will respond to 
the programs put in place.
30 This involves filing a motion according to Sentencing Guideline 5K1.1 or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
31 This involves a court order under 18 USC. §§ 6001–6003. 
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Appendix: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
Assume that  ε is sufficiently close to zero so that  [ θ 12 − 2ε,  θ 12 + 2ε] ∈ (0, 1) ; 
after observing  θ 12 the density of firm  1 ’s posterior about  τ is
(A1)  g (τ |  θ 12 ) =  
⎧
 
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 g (τ )   ________________  
g ( θ 12 + ε) − g ( θ 12 − ε) , if τ ∈ [ θ 12 − ε,  θ 12 + ε] 
0, otherwise.
  
The conditional density  h ( θ 22 |  θ 12 ) of the other firm’s observation  θ 22 is
  h ( θ 22 |  θ 12 ) =  ∫ −ε +ε g ( θ 22 − x |  θ 12 )   1 __ 2ε   dx 
with support  θ 22 ∈ [ θ 12 − 2ε,  θ 12 + 2ε] .
Because  lim ε→0   E [τ |  θ i2 ] =  θ i2 , it follows that for  ε sufficiently small, if 
θ i2 >  1 + ℓ ____1 + f , then  i ’s conditionally expected payoff from  L is greater than from  n 
regardless of the rival’s choice, so  L is conditionally (strictly) dominant for  i when 
firm  i observes  θ i2 >  1 + ℓ ____1 + f .
Letting  H denote the cdf of the density  h , if firm  2 plays  L for  θ 22 >  1 + ℓ ____1 + f , then 
firm  1 observing  θ 12 =  1 + ℓ ____1 + f must assign at least probability
  1 − H ( θ 12 |  θ 12 ) = 1 −  ∫  θ 12 −2ε  θ 12    [ ∫ −ε +ε  g ( θ 22 − x |  θ 12 )   1 __ 2ε dx ]  d θ 22 
to firm  2 ’s choosing  L ; but this equals  1 _2 as  ε converges to zero because
 lim ε→0
   ∫  θ 12 −2ε  θ 12  [  ∫ −ε 
+ε g ( θ 22 − x |  θ 12 )  dx
  ________________ 
2ε ]  d θ 22 
  =  lim ε→0
   ∫  θ 12 −2ε  θ 12   g ( θ 22 − ε |  θ 12 ) + g ( θ 22 + ε |  θ 12 )     _________________________2  d θ 22 
  =  lim ε→0
   g ( θ 12 + ε) − g ( θ 12 − ε)    __________________
g ( θ 12 + ε) − g ( θ 12 − ε)   
1 _
2
=  1 _
2
,
where the first equality is obtained by applying l’Hopital’s Rule to the expres-
sion in square brackets, and the second equality follows from  g (τ |  θ 12 ) = 0 for 
 τ <  θ 12 − ε and the definition of  g (τ |  θ 12 ) in (A1) for  τ ∈ [ θ 12 − ε,  θ 12 + ε]. 
Let  α ≥  1 _2 be the probability that firm 1 assigns to firm 2’s choosing  L . Firm  1 ’s 
expected payoff from  L is
  α (1 −  ρ __2)   ( f − ℓ)   π 2 + (1 − α) ( f − ℓ)   π 2 =  (1 −  
αρ ___
2
 )   ( f − ℓ)   π 2 , 
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and firm  1 ’s conditionally expected payoff from  n is
   α(1 − ρ) (1 −  θ 12 )   (1 + f )   π 2 + (1 − α) (1 −  θ 12 )   (1 + f )   π 2 
    =  (1 − αρ)   ( f − ℓ)   π 2 , 
where the equality uses  θ 12 =  1 + ℓ ____1 + f , which is less than the expected payoff from  L . 
Thus,  n can be excluded by iterated dominance for  θ i2 =  1 + ℓ ____1 + f .
Let  θ i2 ∗ be the largest observation for which  L cannot be established by iterated 
dominance, i.e.,  θ i2 ∗ is the lower bound on the iterated dominance region. By sym-
metry,  θ 12 ∗ =  θ 22 ∗ ≡  θ 2 ∗. Let  α be the probability that firm 1 assigns to firm 2 choos-
ing  L . Iterated dominance requires firm  2 to play  L for any  θ 22 >  θ 2 ∗, so if firm 
1 observes  θ 2 ∗, it will be  α ≥  1 _2. By the definition of  θ 2 ∗, it must be that firm  1 ’s 
conditionally expected payoff from  n is greater than or equal to its expected payoff 
from  L, i.e.,
     α (1 −  ρ __2)   ( f − ℓ)   π 2 + (1 − α) ( f − ℓ)   π 2 
        ≤ α(1 − ρ) (1 −  θ 2 ∗)   (1 + f )   π 2 + (1 − α) (1 −  θ 2 ∗)   (1 + f )   π 2 ,
which we can rewrite as
(A2)  θ 2 ∗ ≤ 1 −  
 (2 − αρ)   ( f − ℓ)   _____________ (2 − 2αρ)   (1 + f )  ≤ 1 −  
 (4 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   ____________
2 (2 − ρ)   (1 + f )  =  τ 2 
∗,  
where the second inequality follows from  α ≥  1 _2.
Similarly, as long as  ε is sufficiently small, if  θ i2 < 1 −   (2 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   __________2 (1 − ρ)   (1 + f )  , then 
 i ’s conditionally expected payoff from  n is greater than from  L regardless of the 
rival’s choice, so  n is conditionally (strictly) dominant for  i when firm  i observes 
θ i2 < 1 −   (2 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   __________2 (1 − ρ)   (1 + f )  .
If firm 2 plays  n for  θ 22 < 1 −   (2 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   __________2 (1 − ρ)   (1 + f )  , then firm 1 observing 
θ 12 = 1 −   (2 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   __________2 (1 − ρ)   (1 + f )  must assign at least probability  
1 _2 to firm  2 ’s choosing 
n . Let  α ≤  1 _2 be the probability that firm 1 assigns to firm 2 choosing  L . Firm  1 ’s 
expected payoff from  L is once again  (1 −  αρ __2 )   ( f − ℓ)   π 2 , and firm  1 ’s condition-
ally expected payoff from  n is
   α(1 − ρ) (1 −  θ 12 )   (1 + f )   π 2 + (1 − α) (1 −  θ 12 )   (1 + f )   π 2 
    =  (1 − αρ)    (2 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   ___________ 
2 (1 − ρ)  π 2 , 
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where the equality uses  θ 12 = 1 −   (2 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   __________2 (1 − ρ)   (1 + f )  , which is greater than the 
expected payoff from  L . Thus,  L can be excluded by iterated dominance for 
θ i2 = 1 −   (2 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   __________2 (1 − ρ)   (1 + f )  .
Let  θ i2 ∗∗ be the smallest observation for which  n cannot be established by iter-
ated dominance, i.e.,  θ i2 ∗∗ is the upper bound on the iterated dominance region. By 
symmetry,  θ 12 ∗∗ =  θ 22 ∗∗ ≡  θ 2 ∗∗ . Let  α be the probability which firm 1 assigns to firm 
2 choosing  L . Iterated dominance requires firm  2 to play  n for any  θ 22 <  θ 2 ∗∗ , so 
if firm 1 observes  θ 2 ∗∗ , it will be  α ≤  1 _2. By the definition of  θ 2 ∗∗ , it must be that 
firm  1 ’s conditionally expected payoff from  L is greater than or equal to its expected 
payoff from  n, i.e.,
     α (1 −  ρ __2)   ( f − ℓ)   π 2 +  (1 − α)   ( f − ℓ)   π 2 
     ≥ α(1 − ρ) (1 −  θ 2 ∗∗ )   (1 + f )   π 2 +  (1 − α)   (1 −  θ 2 ∗∗ )   (1 + f )   π 2 ,
which we can rewrite as
(A3)    (1 −  αρ ___2 )   ( f − ℓ) ≥  (1 − αρ)   (1 −  θ 2 ∗∗ )   (1 + f ) ,  or
  θ 2 ∗∗ ≥ 1 −  
(2 − αρ) ( f − ℓ)   _____________
2(1 − αρ) (1 + f )  
 ≥ 1 −  (4 − ρ) ( f − ℓ)   ____________
2(2 − ρ) (1 + f )  =  τ 2 
∗,  
where the second inequality follows from  α ≤  1 _2.
Since  θ 2 ∗∗ ≤  θ 2 ∗ and  θ 2 ∗∗ ≥  τ 2 ∗ ≥  θ 2 ∗, it must be  θ 2 ∗∗ =  τ 2 ∗ =  θ 2 ∗ and the result 
follows.  ∎ 
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: 
The proof that  Ψ 2C s ≥  Ψ 2B s follows from (8) and  h C ≥ h . Given that  h C ≥ h, 
to show that  V 2B s ≥  V 2C s , it is sufficient to show that  ∂  V 2 
s
 ___∂  h 2 ≤ 0 . Using (9) and (8),
 ∂  V 2 
s
 ____∂  h 2  = − (1 −  (1 − ρ) 2 (1 −  τ E ) − ρ (2 − ρ)   ∫ 0  τ 2 
∗  (1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ )   (1 + f ) 
 + ρ (1 −  ρ __2)   ( f − ℓ)   (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) ) 
 = − τ E (1 + f ) + ρ(2 − ρ) (1 + f )   ∫  τ 2 ∗  1 τg (τ )  dτ 
 −  (2 + ℓ + f )   1 _2ρ (2 − ρ)   (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) )   .
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Because  ρ ≤ 1 and  ρ(2 − ρ) is maximized at  ρ = 1, it follows that
 ∂  V 2 
s
 ____∂  h 2  ≤ − τ 
E (1 + f ) +  (1 + f )   ∫  τ 2 ∗  1 τg (τ )  dτ 
 −  (2 + ℓ + f )   1 _2ρ (2 − ρ)   (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) ) 
 = − (1 + f )   ∫ 
0
  τ 2 ∗  τg (τ )  dτ −  (2 + ℓ + f )   1 _2ρ (2 − ρ)   (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) ) < 0.   ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
The proof of Proposition 2 parallels the proof of Proposition 1 starting from the 
paragraph after equation (A2) and is omitted.32
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
 ( i ) Using (8) and (10) , we have
  Ψ 2B s −  Ψ 2C P =  h __  h C ( Ψ 2C 
s −  Ψ 2C P ) +  (h −  h C )   τ E 
 = hρ (2 − ρ)   ∫  τ 2 ∗ 1   (1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ +  (h −  h C )   τ E   .
The first term is positive, while the second is negative and of larger size if and only 
if  
 h C  __
h
 is above a threshold.
 ( ii ) Using (9) and (11) , we have
(A4)  V 2B s −  V 2C P =  h __  h C ( V 2C 
s −  V 2C P ) +  ( h C − h)   τ E (1 + f )  
   = h  [ ρ (2 − ρ)  ______2 [2 (1 + f )  E [τ | τ >  τ 2 ∗] − 2 − ℓ − f ]   (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) ) 
 +  (  h C  ___h − 1)   τ E (1 + f ) ]   .
Using Assumption  A3 , the first term inside the square brackets is negative, while the 
second is positive and of larger size if and only if  
 h C  __
h
 is above a threshold.
32 More precisely,  n is conditionally (strictly) dominant for  i when firm  i observes  θ i2 sufficiently close to zero 
and the upper bound on the iterated dominance region of  n can be shown to be  θ i2 ∗∗ > 1 . 
234 AMEriCAn EConoMiC JournAL: MiCroEConoMiCs AugusT 2015
 ( iii )  Using the definitions of  Ψ 2C s and  Ψ 2C P in (8) and (10),
(A5)
 Ψ 2C s −  Ψ 2C P =  h C [1 −  (1 − ρ) 2 (1 −  τ E ) − ρ (2 − ρ)   ∫ 0  τ 2 
∗
 (1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ ] −  h C τ E 
 =  h C   ρ (2 − ρ)   ∫  τ 2 ∗ 1   (1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ > 0 . 
Using (9) and (11), we have
(A6)
 V 2C s −  V 2C P = 1 −  Ψ 2C s (1 + f ) +  h C ρ (1 −  ρ _2)   ( f − ℓ)   (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) ) 
  −  (1 −  Ψ 2C P (1 + f ) ) 
 =  h C  ρ (1 −  ρ _2)   ( f − ℓ)   (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) ) 
 −  (1 + f )   h C  ρ (2 − ρ)   ∫  τ 2 ∗ 1(1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ
 =  h C  ρ(2 − ρ) (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) )   (1 + f )   1 __2( f − ℓ ___1 + f − 2  
 ∫  τ 2 ∗ 1 (1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ  _____________  (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) )  ) 
 <  h C  ρ(2 − ρ) (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) )   (1 + f )   1 __2( τ 2 ∗ −  1 + ℓ ____1 + f) < 0, 
where the first equality uses (9) and (11), the second equality uses (A5), the first 
inequality uses Assumption  A3, and the final inequality uses  τ 2 ∗ <  1 + ℓ ____1 + f .  ∎ 
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS 3 AND 4:
The proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 parallel the proof of Proposition 1 and are 
omitted.
LEMMA 3: under Assumptions  A1 – A3 , if  θ i1 is sufficiently close to zero, then  n is 
a dominant strategy in the first product game under penalty­plus leniency.
PROOF:
Using Assumptions  A1 and  A2, for the first product game under penalty-plus 
leniency  V 2 =  V 2C P in (12). Strategy  n is dominant when  θ i1 is sufficiently close to 
zero, if and only if
(A7)  (1 − ρ) [ π 1 (1 + f ) +  ( V 2B s −  V 2C P )   π 2 ] >  (1 −  ρ __2)   π 1 ( f − ℓ)  . 
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It is necessary because it is the condition for  n to be a strict best reply to  L, and it is 
sufficient because (A7) implies that  π 1 (1 + f ) +  ( V 2B s −  V 2C P )   π 2 >  π 1 ( f − ℓ) , so 
that  n is also a strict best reply to  n . We can write (A7) equivalently as
  ( V 2B s −  V 2C P )    π 2  __ π 1 >  
 (2 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ) − 2(1 − ρ) (1 + f )     _________________________
2(1 − ρ)  
 =  ρ (2 + f + ℓ) − 2 (1 + ℓ)    __________________
2(1 − ρ) .
Using (A4) , we can rewrite the above inequality as
  (h  ρ (2 − ρ)  _______2 (2 (1 + f )  E [τ | τ >  τ 2 ∗] − 2 − ℓ − f )   (1 − g ( τ 2 ∗) ) 
   +  [ ( h C − h)   τ E (1 + f ) ] )    π 2  __ π 1 
   >  ρ (2 + f + ℓ) − 2 (1 + ℓ)    __________________
2(1 − ρ) .
Dropping the term in square brackets, we have the following sufficient condition:
 ρ <  2 (1 + ℓ)  ________
2 + f + ℓ +  
2(1 − ρ) ________
2 + f + ℓ  hρ (2 − ρ)   (1 + f )   ∫  τ 2 ∗ 1(τ −  2 + ℓ + f ________2 (1 + f )  )  g(τ) dτ    π 2  __ π 1 , 
which, given  τ 2 ∗ =  2 + ℓ + f ______2 (1 + f )  −  
 ( f − ℓ)  _________   (1 + f ) (2 − ρ) and  ∫ 0 
 τ 2 ∗ (τ −  2 + ℓ + f ______2 (1 + f )  )  g(τ)dτ < 0, 
certainly holds if
  ρ <  2 (1 + ℓ)  ________
2 + f + ℓ +  
2(1 − ρ) ________
2 + f + ℓ  hρ (2 − ρ)   (1 + f )   ( τ E −  2 + ℓ + f ________2 (1 + f )   )    π 2  __ π 1  . 
Assumption  A3 states that  E [τ | τ > t ] ≤  1 + t ____2 , which implies that  τ E − 
  2 + ℓ + f ______
2 (1 + f )  ≤  
1 _2 −  
2 + ℓ + f
 ______
2 (1 + f )  =  −  
1 + ℓ ______ 
2 (1 + f ) < 0 . Hence the above inequality cer-
tainly holds if
  ρ <  2 (1 + ℓ)  ________
2 + f + ℓ + 2hρ ( 2 (1 + f )   τ 
E   _________
2 + f + ℓ − 1)    π 2  __ π 1 , 
which holds by Assumption  A1 .  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
The strengths of prosecution and preemption effects are as given in Table A1.
We show that the prosecution and the preemption effects are decreasing in  ℓ . To 
do so, we show that the lower bounds of integration in the prosecution effect column 
of Table A1 (the same as the upper bounds of integration in the preemption effect 
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column) are increasing in  ℓ approximately linearly, that the lower bounds of integra-
tion in the preemption effect column of Table A1 are increasing in  ℓ approximately 
linearly, and that the lower bounds of integration in the preemption effect columns 
are increasing at a faster rate than the upper bounds. For product 2, the result fol-
lows from Table A1 and the fact that  τ 2 ∗ and  1 + ℓ ____1 + f are both linear and increasing in  ℓ, 
with  
∂  τ 2 ∗ ___∂ ℓ >  
∂  ( 1 + ℓ ____1 + f) 
 ______∂ ℓ . For product 1 with standard leniency, using (13),
 
∂  τ 1B ∗  ___∂ ℓ =  
 (4 − ρ)  2 (2 − ρ)   [1 + f +  ( V 2B s −  V 2C s )    π 2  __ π 1 ] +  (4 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)   ( ∂  V 2B 
s  _____∂ ℓ −  
∂  V 2C s  _____∂ ℓ )    π 2  __ π 1     _________________________________________    
 (2 (2 − ρ)   [1 + f +  ( V 2B s −  V 2C s )    π 2  __ π 1 ] ) 
2
 
  , 
which is positive for  
 π 2  __ π 1 sufficiently small or for  h C sufficiently close to  h , in 
which case  V 2B s −  V 2C s and  ∂  V 2B 
s  ___∂ ℓ −  
∂  V 2C s  ___∂ ℓ are close to zero. The analysis is similar 
for product 1 with penalty-plus, using (18). The bounds of integration in Table 
A1,  
1 + ℓ + ( V 2B s −  V 2C s )  π 2  __ π 1  ______________
1 + f + ( V 2B s −  V 2C s )  π 2  __ π 1 
  and  
1 + ℓ + ( V 2B s −  V 2C P )  π 2  __ π 1  ______________
1 + f + ( V 2B s −  V 2C P )  π 2  __ π 1 
  are also increasing in  ℓ for   π 2  __ π 1 
 sufficiently small or for  h C sufficiently close to  h . Furthermore, for   π 2  __ π 1 sufficiently 
small or for  h C sufficiently close to  h ,
 
∂  τ 1B ∗  ___∂ ℓ ≈  
 (4 − ρ)  2 (2 − ρ)   (1 + f ) _______________  
 (2 (2 − ρ) (1 + f )) 2 
 =   (4 − ρ)  ________  
2 (2 − ρ) (1 + f) >  
1 ___ 1 + f ≈  
∂  ( 
1 + ℓ + ( V 2B s −  V 2C s )  π 2  __ π 1    ________________
1 + f + ( V 2B s −  V 2C s )  π 2  __ π 1 
 )    ________________ ∂ ℓ , 
and similarly for the comparison of  
∂  τ 1P ∗  ___∂ ℓ and  
∂  ( 
1 + ℓ + ( V 2B s −  V 2C P )  π 2  __ π 1    ________________
1 + f + ( V 2B s −  V 2C P )  π 2  __ π 1 
 ) 
   _________________ ∂ ℓ .  ∎ 
Table A1—Strength of Prosecution and Preemption Effects by Environment and Product
Prosecution effect  
(L dominant)
Preemption effect  
(L risk dominant)
Relevant 
proposition
Product 1
 Standard leniency
  ∫ 
 
1+ℓ+( V 2B s − V 2C s )  π 2  __ π 1  ________________
1+f+( V 2B s − V 2C s )  π 2  __ π 1 
  
 1   g(τ) dτ   ∫  τ 1B ∗  
 
1+ℓ+( V 2B s − V 2C s )  π 2  __ π 1  ________________
1+f+( V 2B s − V 2C s )  π 2  __ π 1 
  
 g(τ) dτ 
Proposition 3
 Penalty-plus
  ∫ 
 
1+ℓ+( V 2B s − V 2C P )  π 2  __ π 1  ________________
1+f+( V 2B s − V 2C P )  π 2  __ π 1 
  
 1 g(τ) dτ   ∫  τ 1P ∗  
 
1+ℓ+( V 2B s − V 2C P )  π 2  __ π 1  ________________
1+f+( V 2B s − V 2C P )  π 2  __ π 1 
  
 g(τ) dτ 
Proposition 4
Product 2
 Standard leniency and 
  penalty-plus without conviction   ∫  1+ℓ ____
1+f
 1 g(τ) dτ   ∫  τ 2 ∗  
1+ℓ ____
1+f g(τ) dτ 
Proposition 1
 Penalty-plus with conviction 0 0 Proposition 2
source: Authors’ calculations
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
Using Table A1, it is sufficient to show that  τ 2 ∗,  τ 1B ∗ , and  τ 1P ∗ are decreasing in  ρ , 
which is straightforward to show for  
 π 2  __ π 1 sufficiently small or for  h C sufficiently close 
to  h .  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7:
By (14) and ( 19), under Assumptions  A1 – A3 ,
(A8)  Ψ 1 P −  Ψ 1 s = hρ (2 − ρ)   ∫  τ 1P ∗   τ 1B 
∗  (1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ > 0. 
By (15) and (20),
  Ψ 2 P −  Ψ 2 s =  Ψ 1 PΨ 2C P + (1 −  Ψ 1 P) Ψ 2B s −  Ψ 1 sΨ 2C s − (1 −  Ψ 1 s) Ψ 2B s 
 < ( Ψ 1 P −  Ψ 1 s) ( Ψ 2C P −  Ψ 2B s ) < 0 ,
where the first inequality follows from  Ψ 2C P <  Ψ 2C s by Lemma 2(iii) , and the sec-
ond inequality follows from (A8) and Lemma 2(i) as long as  h C  / h <  r A ∗ . 
Finally, by (17) and (22),
 V P π 1 −  V s π 1 =  ( V 1 P −  V 1 s)   π 1 +  ( Ψ 1 PV 2C P −  Ψ 1 sV 2C s )   π 2 +  ( Ψ 1 s −  Ψ 1 P) V 2B s π 2 
 >  ( V 1 P −  V 1 s)   π 1 +  ( Ψ 1 P −  Ψ 1 s)   ( V 2C P −  V 2B s )   π 2 > 0 ,
where the first inequality follows from  V 2C P >  V 2C s by Lemma 2(iii) , and the 
second inequality follows, as long as  π 2  /  π 1 is above a threshold, because 
 ( Ψ 1 P −  Ψ 1 s)   ( V 2C P −  V 2B s ) > 0 by (A8) and Lemma 2(ii), which says that 
 V 2C P >  V 2B s if  h C  / h <  r B ∗.  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8:
By (8) and (9),  ∂  Ψ 2B s  ____∂  h C  =  
∂  V 2B s  ___∂  h C  = 0 , while  
∂  Ψ 2C s  ____∂  h C  =  
 Ψ 2C s  ___ h C  > 0 and  
∂  V 2C s  ___∂  h C  = −   
 Ψ 2C s  ___ h C  . 
×  (1 + f ) < 0 . Hence, it follows from (13) and (14) that
  
∂  τ 1B ∗  ____∂  h C  = −  
 (4 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)  2 (2 − ρ)    π 2  __ π 1   ____________________________   
 (2 (2 − ρ)   [1 + f +  ( V 2B s −  V 2C s )    π 2  __ π 1 ] ) 
2
 
  ∂  V 2C 
s  ____∂  h C  > 0, and 
  
∂  Ψ 1 s ____∂  h C = −hρ(2 − ρ) (1 −  τ 1B 
∗ )  g ( τ 1B ∗ )   ∂  τ 1B 
∗  ____∂  h C  < 0 . 
By (15),
  
∂  Ψ 2 s ____∂  h C =  
 Ψ 2C s  ___ h C  ( Ψ 1 s +  ( h C − h)   ∂  Ψ 1 
s
 ____∂  h C ) , 
238 AMEriCAn EConoMiC JournAL: MiCroEConoMiCs AugusT 2015
which is positive for  h C sufficiently close to  h . 
By (10) and (11),  ∂  Ψ 2C P  ____∂  h C  =  τ 
E > 0 and  ∂  V 2C P  ___∂  h C  = − τ 
E (1 + f ) < 0 . Hence, it 
follows from (18) and (19) that
  
∂  τ 1P ∗  ____∂  h C  = −  
 (4 − ρ)   ( f − ℓ)  2 (2 − ρ)    π 2  __ π 1   ____________________________   
 (2 (2 − ρ)   [1 + f +  ( V 2B s −  V 2C P )    π 2  __ π 1 ] ) 
2
 
  ∂  V 2C 
P  ____∂  h C  > 0, and 
(A9)  ∂  Ψ 1 
P
 ____∂  h C  = −hρ(2 − ρ) (1 −  τ 1P 
∗ )  g ( τ 1P ∗ )   ∂  τ 1P 
∗  ____∂  h C  < 0 . 
By (20),
  
∂  Ψ 2 P ____∂  h C  =  
∂  Ψ 1 P ____∂  h C    ( Ψ 2C 
P −  Ψ 2B s ) +  Ψ 1 P  ∂  Ψ 2C 
P  ____∂  h C  , 
where the second term is positive and the first term is also positive by (A9) and 
Lemma 2(i) as long as  h C  / h is less than the threshold  r A ∗.  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9:
First, note that
  
∂  Ψ 2i s  ____∂  h 2  =  
 Ψ 2i s  ___ h 2  > 0 . 
Second, by (8) we have
 Ψ 2i s =  h 2 [1 −  (1 − ρ) 2 ∫  τ 2 ∗ 1(1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ −  ∫ 0  τ 2 
∗
 (1 − τ )  g (τ )  dτ ] 
 =  h 2 [1 −  (1 − ρ) 2 ∫  τ 2 ∗ 1   g (τ )  dτ − ρ (2 − ρ)   (1 −  τ 2 ∗)  g ( τ 2 ∗) −  ∫ 0  τ 2 
∗
    g (τ )  dτ ] ,
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. It is immediate that a 
first order stochastic shift in the distribution of  τ , by reducing  g(τ) , increases  Ψ 2i s . 
By (A10), it is also immediate that a first order stochastic shift in the distribution of 
τ increases  ∂  Ψ 2i s  ___∂  h 2  , and, hence, resources for investigation and prosecution are strate-
gic complements.  ∎ 
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